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THE HIGHEST LAW 
In a recent address, Mr. Joseph 
J. Casper, Assistant Director of the 
FBI, asserted that "a society living 
under the rule of law cannot permit 
persons to choose the Jaws which they 
will obey and the Jaws which they 
will break." But on reading the rest 
of his speech, one wonders whether 
he would strenuously object if the 
police were permitted to select the 
laws which they must obey and those 
they may disregard. 
Mr. Casper stressed "the citizen's 
individual responsibility of cultivating 
a respect for the Jaw so deep and 
constant that he becomes an example 
for ail others to emulate," but one 
wonders whether he felt nearly as 
strongly about the law enforcement 
officer's need to cultivate a respect for 
the ·law so deep and constant that he 
becomes an example for all. 
Mr. Casper manages to be a good 
deal less bedazzled by the mystique 
of ."the law" when he comes up 
agamst a law he does not like. He 
protests, for example, that "criminals 
are freed on technicalities despite the 
fact that many of them are repeat-
ers" and "some courts appear to be 
more concerned with rewriting the 
law than interpreting it." 
I take it that when the Court sus-
tains the power of the government to 
"stop and frisk" on less than the tra-
ditional "probable cause" to • arrest 
and search, Terry v. Ohio (1968), or 
to deceptively place a secret informer 
in the quarters and councils of the 
defendant, Hoffa v. United States 
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(1966), or to hide the identity of 
an aileged informer on the issue of 
"probable cause," McCray v. Illinois 
( 1967) (why is it that the govern-
ment's zeal for an unobstructed 
"search for the truth" diminishes rap-
idly when one of its "privileges" con-
stitutes the obstacle?), or to extract 
blood over a suspect's protest, 
Schmerber v. California ( 1966) or 
from an unconscious person, Breit-
haupt v. Abram (1957), it is simply 
"interpreting" or "applying" the Jaw. 
I take it, on the other hand, that 
whenever the Court decides a case 
adversely to law enforcement (as its 
officers see it), as when it applies 
the right to counsel and the privilege 
against self-incrimination to the po-
lice station as weil as the courtroom, 
Miranda v. Arizona (1966), Escobe-
do v. Illinois, it is "making" or "re-
writing" the ·law-or invoking mere 
"technicalities." 
(Who is to decide whether a con-
stitutional right is a real right or only 
a technicality? Each police officer? 
Each police department? The FBI?) 
"We must," Mr. Casper insists, "be 
ailowed to enforce the law-ail Jaws 
--every minute of every day of every 
week of the year." But it is evident 
that he feels somewhat differently 
about the duty of the courts: "When 
officers go before some courts they 
know what to expect. First, they and 
the prosecution will be tried. Guilt or 
innocence of the accused is secondary 
to matters of form. Was the defend-
ant advised of all his rights? Was the 
search legal?" 
Apparently the courts, unlike the 
police, are not supposed to enforce 
ail the laws all the time. Indeed, Mr. 
Casper seems to be saying that it 
would be nice if the courts would 
disregard some Jaws all the time-
those he considers to be "bad Jaws" 
from the viewpoint of law enforce-
ment and dismisses as "technicalities" 
or "matters of form." 
But it is unclear who-if not the 
highest court of the land-is to de-
cide which constitutional rights are 
real or important rights and which 
are simply "technicalities" or "mat-
ters of form." 
Mr. Casper is for calling "a spade 
a spade." So am I. Although law ·en-
forcement spokesmen have frequently 
preached that you cannot pick and 
choose among good and bad laws, 
according to each individual's or sub-
group's concept of morality, without 
destroying the whole concept of the 
rule of law, too many of our Jaw 
enforcement officers have engaged in 
just such picking and choosing when 
confronting "liberal" rules of proce-
dure which might free persons who 
"ought to be" punished. 
They have practiced "civil dis-
obedience," if you want to call it 
that, to promote what they conceive 
to be worthy causes. Although Mr. 
Casper warns that "the first evidence 
of each society's decay appeared in 
the toleration of disobedience of its 
laws and the judgments of its courts," 
too many police chiefs and prosecu-
tors (and their "supporters") have 
long tolerated, if not encouraged, dis-
obedience of our Jaws and the judg-
ments of our courts, which, in their 
opinion, unduly obstruct them in 
their pursuit of suspected criminals. 
An example from the field of 
search and seizure should suffice: 
• When-six years before the U.S. 
Supreme Court was to impose the 
exclusionary rule on state courts as 
a matter of federal constitutional law 
-the Supreme Court of California 
adopted the exclusionary rule on its 
own in People v. Cahan, ( 1955), 
Judge Traynor noted that police wit-
nesses had freely admitted to mak-
ing "numerous forcible entries and 
searches without search warants." 
"Thus," he observed: 
[W]ithout fear of criminal punish-
ment or other discipline, law enforce-
ment officers, sworn to support the 
[federal · and state] constitutions, 
frankly admit their deliberate, fia~ 
grant acts in violation of both Consti-
tutions and the laws enacted there-
(Continued on page 17) 
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under. It is clearly apparent from 
their testimony that they casually re-
gard such acts as nothing more than 
the performance of their ordinary 
duties for which the city employs and 
pays them. 
As Judge Traynor stressed some 
years later, prior to the imposition 
of the exclusionary rule the courts 
were condoning not "an occasional 
constable's blunder," but a "routine 
procedure" of "deliberate" and "fla-
grant" police illegality. 
The police, of course, do not al-
ways frankly admit their misconduct. 
They sometimes resort to perjury to 
subvert "bad laws." As Profesor Irv-
ing Younger, a former federal prose-
cutor, recently observed in "The Per-
jury Routine," 3 Criminal Law Bulle-
tin 551, 552 (1967): 
For the first few months [after Mapp 
v. Ohio], New York policemen con-
tinued to tell the truth about the cir-
cumstance.s of their searches, with the 
result that evidence was suppressed. 
Then the police made the gre'llt dis-
covery that if the defendant drops the 
narcotics on the ground, after which 
the policeman arrests him, then the 
search is reasonable and the evidence 
is admissible. Spend a few hours in 
the New York City Criminal Court 
nowadays, and you will hear case 
after case in which a policeman testi-
fies that the defendant dropped the 
rvarcotics on the ground, whereupon 
the policeman arrested him. Usually 
the very Language of the testimony is 
identical from one case to another. 
This is now known among defense 
lawyers and prosecutors as "dropsy" 
t~>rtimony. 
The amicus brief of the N a-
tiona! District Attorney's Association 
(NDAA) in Miranda touched upon 
the subject of police perjury in a 
curious way. In urging the Supreme 
Court not to require police interroga-
tors to advise suspects of their rights, 
the NDAA argued: "[B]y establishing 
unworkable requirements do we not 
further undermine and demoralize the 
police officer, forcing him to 'stretch 
the truth'?" The NDAA then called 
the Court's attention to the experi-
ence of the English in the use of the 
Judges' Rules, quoting from Devlin, 
The Criminal Prosecution in England 
4 7 ( 1960) : "It is difficult to say to 
what extent the spirit of the Rules 
is infringed because . . . it is the 
general habit of the police never to 
admit to the slightest departure from 
correctness." (Emphasis supplied by 
the NDAA Brief) . "A rule for a 
rule's sake," the NDAA then warned 
the Court, "is not the answer." 
Why are so many law enforcement 
officers so ready and willing to vio-
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late or at ·least circumvent, laws that 
cra~p their style? And to "stretch the 
truth" in a court of law? I feel the 
answer is because so many view 
themselves as "soldiers" waging war 
against the "criminal army"-and 
all's fair in love and war. 
As James Reston once pointed out, 
"the more complicated life becomes, 
the more people are attracted to 
simple solutions. 
It is not surprising that as the 
"crime problem" grows more com-
plex, baffling and frustrating, the 
"war theory of crime control" be-
comes more attractive. But for the 
last century at least there has never 
been a time (according to the mass 
media) when we weren't experiencing 
a "crime crisis" nor a time when the 
"war theory" lacked real appeal. 
Indeed, the most incisive descrip-
tion of it I have ever read was writ-
ten by an ex-crime reporter named 
Ernest J. Hopkins in 1931 (Our Law-
less Police 319) : 
Being the enemy, he [the criminal, 
or more accurately, the person ac-
cused or suspected of crime~ has no 
rights worthy of the name. He is to 
be met by the weapons of war. In-
dividual rights, including those of 
non-combatants, are subject to inva-
sion like the rights of non-combatants 
irt wartime. The policeman is a 
peacetime soldier. If bullets go astray, 
if civilians are inconvenienced, if civil 
rights are suspended, those are acci-
denrfs inherent in a warfare that is 
waged in crowded cities. Criminolo-
gists of the humanitarian class are to 
be scorned, because they are the paci-
fists in this war. Defense attorneys are 
to be frustrated and outwitted because 
they are the enemy's diplomatic corps. 
Citizens who would make objection 
to the excess of authority indulged in 
for the protection of the public are 
giving aid and comfort to the enemy. 
If the Constitution forbids internal 
war, then the Constitution is techni-
cal and pettifogging, and for its own 
good it must be protected against it-
self. Its makers in any case could not 
have foreseen the pass to which this 
war has come. The law of war is the 
law of necessity. ThereJ are certain 
rules of war, but they do not strictly 
bind, and atrocities are only to be dep-
recated because they may become 
public and hurt the cause-not be-
cause the enemy is entitled to the 
least consideration. 
Not a few people are disturbed that 
when criticism of the handling of the 
Vietnam war touches a nerve, high 
Administration officials snap back: 
"Whose side are you on?" But I 
would hate to count the many times 
law enforcement spokesmen have 
as~ed their critics (sometimes subtly, 
sometimes not so subtly) : "Whose 
side are you on, the side of the law 
and order-or the side of the rapist, 
the dope peddler or the rioter?" Those 
caught up in "a war" find it much 
easier to question their critics' moti-
vation than to answer their argu-
ments. 
Many law enforcement officials 
reacted to public disclosures of wide-
spread wiretapping and bugging in 
government and industry, to the tele-
vised spectacle of Chicago police 
clubbing unresisting demonstrators 
and, a few years ago, to the dissemi-
nation of the gory details concerning 
George Whitmore's discredited "con-
fession" with the same animosity the 
Pentagon felt toward the New York 
Times and Harrison Salisbury for the 
latter's dispatches from Hanoi on the 
civilian deaths produced by our air 
raids. · 
When you are fighting "a war" 
(whether it be against the enemy 
abroad or the "criminal army" at 
(Continued on page 54) 
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dence that a citizen has a correlative 
duty for every right he possesses. 
Long ago the Massachusetts Dec-
laration of Rights put this obligation 
squarely in the following words: 
Each individual of the society has 
a right to be protected by it in the en-
joyment of his life, liberty, and prop-
erty, according to standing laws. He 
is obliged, consequently, to contribute 
his share to the expense of his pro-
tection; to give his personal service or 
an equivalent, when necessary. 
Thus, both in law and fact, the fight 
against crime and the keeping of the 
public peace is the joint-obligation, 
the mutual task, the common trust of 
the ordinary citizen and the profes-
sional police officer. . . . 
A basic civic obligation, which 
ought to be self-evident but unfortu-
nately is not, is the citizen's individual 
responsibility of cultivating a respect 
for the law so deep and constant that 
he becomes an example for all others 
to emulate. 
This elementary attitude is just as 
contagious as the unhealthy disregard 
for law and contempt for authority of 
all kinds which permeates our society 
so widely today. 
In America, the quest for truth is a 
recognized and honored principle. It 
KAMISAR 
(Continued from page 17) 
home) , "the hiding of ugly facts 
which the public 'might not under-
stand' comes under the heading of 
war propaganda." (Hopkins, supra at 
320). 
The late Chief Wiiiiam Parker of 
Los Angeles, perhaps the nation's 
most famous police chief, once main-
tained in a televised debate on wire-
tapping and electronic eavesdropping 
that the police "are just like the U.S. 
Army in Korea which is limited by 
the Yalu River boundary, and the re-
sult of it is that they are losing the 
war just like "we lost the war in Ko-
rea." Chief Parker invoked the mili-
tary analogy more explicitly than do 
most of his colleagues, but it is not 
uncommon for law enforcement 
spokesmen to grumble about search 
and seizure, police interrogation and 
other restrictions in much the man-
ner our generals complain about the 
"limitations" imposed on them. 
Almost invariably, the day after a 
"liberal" Supreme Court decision has 
been handed down, e.g., McNabb 
(1943), Mallory (1957), Jencks 
(1957), Mapp (1961), Escobedo 
(1964) , and Miranda (1966) , news-
paper headlines and grief-stricken 
law enforcement officers proclaim it 
to be a "crippling"-if not a "death" 
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is treasured as much as the freedoms 
which make it possible. Our beliefs 
and hopes rest on the premise that the 
search for truth shall help to keep us 
free. 
Unfortunately, the search for truth 
in some legal jurisdictions today is in-
cidental to the skirmishes which occur 
before and during trial. . . . 
When officers go before some 
courts they know what to expect. 
First, they and the prosecution will 
be tried. Guilt or innocence of the 
accused is secondary to matters of 
form. 
Was the defendant advised of all 
his rights? Was the search legal? Is 
the "t" crossed and the "i" dotted? 
Was the defendant's name spelled 
correctly, and was the search warrant 
valid? ... 
We need to take a long, hard look 
at the administration of justice in this 
country. It seems incongruous that 
our system of criminal justice should 
provide more and better protection 
for the guilty than for law-abiding 
citizens. 
Criminals are freed on technicali-
ties despite the fact that many of them 
are repeaters. Some courts appear to 
be more concerned with rewriting the 
law than interpreting it. 
What is law enforcement to do? 
We have no choice. Our position is 
clear. We are committed to seek the 
-blow. Yet almost invariably subse-
quent intensive studies, e.g., Medalie, 
Leitz & Alexander, Custodial Police 
Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: 
The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 
66 Mich. L. Rev. 1347 (1968); See-
burger & Wettick, Miranda in Pitts-
burgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. 
Pitt. L. Rev. 1 ( 1967); Interroga-
tions in New Haven: The Impact of 
Miranda, 76 Yale L. J. 1519 (1967) 
-reported in the back pages of the 
newspapers if reported at all-reveal 
that these expressions of horror and 
dismay and predictions of doom were 
grossly exaggerated. 
In recent years there has been con-
siderable alarm and agitation about 
the "credibility gap" in the Whit,e 
House and the Pentagon, but few 
Americans indeed seem to have any 
grasp of the dimensions of the "credi-
bility gap" in many a police head-
quarters and district attorney's office. 
As Justice Samuel Roberts of the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania re-
cently pointed out in an address to 
the trial judges of his state: 
[I]f we crumpled the entire Bill 
of Rights into a ball and threw it in 
the ocean, robbery, rape and murder 
would still stand tall on dry land; it 
would be justice, not crime, that 
would drown. Men do not read re-
ports of litigation before they set out 
truth under the rules laid down by the 
courts. 
One major need, however, is a 
clear-cut set of operating rules. 
The high courts take months to 
reach a split decision on issues which 
they require the policeman to decide 
in a split-second. 
Further, we also know that today's 
law may not be tomorrow's law. 
These changing conditions present a 
continuing challenge to law enforce-
ment. 
Nevertheless, we must rise to the 
demands of the hour. We must adopt 
new methods that meet the tests estab-
lished by the many new decisions we 
face. 
Aside from additional training and 
equipment, higher standards and more 
citizen cooperation, law enforcement 
must avail itself of the highly devel-
oped scientific advancements which 
are so vital to crime prevention and 
solution .... 
We cannot afford to accept condi-
tions as they are in our country today. 
We cannot afford to wait for someone 
else to take a stand for right over 
wrong and good over evil. We cannot 
afford to sit placidly on the mountain 
top of benevolent indifference and fid-
dle while would-be revolutionists put 
a torch to a nation conceived in lib· 
erty and built on the principles of 
freedom and justice for all. 0 
to violate the law. But they do read 
newspapers; and to the extent that 
people in public life falsely cry out 
that the courts of our land aid and 
abet the lawless to the detriment of 
society, these unwise utterances are 
more likely to inspire criminal con-
duct than the very decision they de-
ride. 
As Ernest Hopkins pointed out 37 
years ago, "crime is not war," but 
"more nearly akin to disease in the 
blood," and "get tough" tactics con-
stitute a sorry attempt "to drive crime 
back by hammering the external 
sores." As Professor James Q. Wilson 
recently observed, "perhaps the major 
conclusion of the [President's Crime] 
Commission-and, given its conserva-
tive membership, certainly its most 
remarkable one-is that basically 
crime can only be reduced by funda-
mental social changes." Wilson, A 
Reader's Guide to the Crime Com-
mission Reports, The Public Interest, 
Fall 1967, pp. 64, 74. 
It is no easy task, however, to re-
fute the "devil theory" of social ills; 
to shatter "the illusion of American 
omnipotence"-the iiiusion, as D. w. 
Brogan put it, "that any situation 
which distresses or endangers the 
United States can only exist because 
some Americans have been fools or 
knaves." 0 
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